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19Lever Brothers, the South African tax case that formed the basis of 
this research, was concerned with determining the source of interest 
income. In its time, this was one of the landmark cases and established 
tax principles that were valid for 54 years, until superseded by changes 
to legislation.
20The research presented a critical analysis of the three judgments in the 
case, exposing weaknesses in each. It also provided a condensed account 
of the history of the company, the historical era in which the transactions 
giving rise to the case took place, a glimpse into the lives of the judges, 
as well as a discussion of the development in South Africa of the rules 
for determining source. The most important focus of the research was 
the discussion of the use and validity of the practical man principle, and 
it was concluded that this principle should be applied, not in lieu of legal 
theory, but to restrain its unbridled use when unjust results would ensue.
21Key words:  Lever Brothers and Unilever; South African income tax; source of income; interest; 
the “practical man”; the “reasonable man”; Chief Justice E.F. Watermeyer; Judge 
of Appeal O.D. Schreiner; Acting Judge of Appeal, R.P.B Davis
For the person whom Lord Atkin1 had in mind was the practical man and not the legal theo-
rist who, by resolutely shutting his eyes to all the facts, could prove that black was white.2 
1The Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd case (referred 
to as “the Lever Brothers case”) dealt with the question of determining the source 
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of interest income and, in spite of the fact that most of the decision is no longer 
relevant, it is important for the opportunity it presents to criticise the “practical 
man” principle as applied in a number of cases dealing with the source of income. 
In the Lever Brothers case, each of the three judges referred to the practical man in 
his judgment but, just as the judgments of the three judges differed (Watermeyer JA, 
Schreiner JA and Davis AJA), so each described a different hypothetical conclusion 
that this practical man might have arrived at, based on the facts of the case.
2In its time, the Lever Brothers case set a lasting precedent in South African income 
tax law that not only established the basis on which the source of income earned in the 
form of interest should be determined, but also, it is submitted, established a two-step 
test that can still be used when interrogating the source of other classes of income. 
But the Lever Brothers case also provided the opportunity to explore the extraordinary 
story behind the case: the company, the historical era and the personalities involved, 
and in this way to add colour to the facts of the case and the legal arguments.
3The Lever Brothers case therefore provides the foundation for a discussion which 
aims to achieve the following goals:
• to discuss the facts of the case and analyse the judicial arguments presented in 
the case;
• to enhance the scholar’s interest in and understanding of the case by placing it 
within its historical context, sketching the history of one of the largest groups of 
companies in the world and providing a brief portrait of the judges involved in 
the case;
• to explain the development of the source rules in South African income tax law 
subsequent to the case; and
• to discuss the use of the practical man principle in tax law and compare its use 
with the “reasonable man” principle applied in civil and criminal law.
1In addition to the pedagogical contribution referred to in the introduction to 
this series of articles, this article makes a significant contribution in the field of 
taxation. The discussion of the facts of the case and the in-depth analysis of the 
three judgments will, to a certain extent, challenge the established interpretation 
of the ratio decidendi of the judgment. While a great deal has been written on the 
source of income in various jurisdictions,3 no research could be identified that 
3 For example: Dinnison, I. 1995. Australia Relies on Residence. International Tax Review. Volume 6, 34; Halyard, A.J. 
1990. Hong Kong Profi ts tax: The Source Concept: Part II. Hong Kong Law Journal. Volume 20, 320; Liang. T.W. 1990. 
Source of Interest:Ssection 10 and Section 12(6) of the Income Tax Act. Malaya Law Review. Volume 30, 393; Hern Kuan, 
L. 1992. Income Tax – Source Principal Refi ned? Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 566–578.
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dealt specifically with the practical man principle in South African tax law.4 As this 
principle is frequently referred to in judgments, the critical analysis of its use makes 
an important contribution.
2The article proceeds as follows: first a brief history of the company is presented; 
this is followed by an analysis of the facts of the case. The facts of the case are further 
explained by placing them in the context in which the case arose and was heard. 
Then a critical analysis of the judgment is conducted, together with a presentation of 
a “thumbnail” sketch of the judges involved. An exposition of the development of the 
source rules from the date of the Lever Brothers case follows and, finally, an analysis 
and critique of the practical man principle concludes the discussion.
Lever Brothers and Unilever: the company
1William Hesketh Lever, a business giant, philanthropist and art collector, who died 
in 1925 as Viscount Leverhulme, was the founder of the Lever Brothers business 
empire.5 He started out in 1867 at the age of 15, working for his father in his grocery 
business, and became a partner five years later. With his prodigious energy and 
vision, he recognised the marketing opportunity in branding and packaging, and 
Sunlight soap was born in 1884 it is still a popular brand today). His first business 
decision was to cut out the middleman, initially, by buying soap directly from 
the producers and then, in 1885, producing the soap himself in a rented factory 
in Warrington (England). Soon, owing to his astute use of advertising, demand 
quickly outstripped supply, and in 1887, he bought an open site at Bebington, the 
Wirral, which offered a river frontage for importing raw materials and a railway 
close by for transporting the finished product, and built a factory at what became 
known as Port Sunlight.
2William Lever was not only a business pioneer, but a pioneer in recognising 
corporate social responsibility. He introduced a wide range of employment benefits, 
including pensions, sickness and unemployment insurance, shorter working weeks, 
holidays with pay, dining rooms for his employees and medical and recreational 
facilities, and he housed his employees in a model village of well-built homes on the 
factory site. The Lever Brothers product range and the production sites expanded 
rapidly (some of the brands are still in existence), and by 1910, there were factories 
4 Other than: Grenville, D. 2014. A Critical Analysis of the Practical Man Principle in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v 
Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd. Unpublished master’s degree thesis. Grahamstown, Rhodes University.
5 Wilson, C. 1954. The History of Unilever. A Study in Economic Growth and Social Change. London: Cassell & Company 
Ltd.
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all over the world. The company diversified into making margarine, and in 1929, 
Lever Brothers merged with the Margarine Union (an amalgamation of mainly Dutch 
companies) and Unilever came into being.
3This was the group of companies that shortly before the outbreak of the Second 
World War entered into the transactions that gave rise to the Lever Brothers case.
The facts of the Lever Brothers case6
1Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd and Associated Enterprises Ltd, two English 
companies, were assessed for South African income tax for the 1940 to 1942 years of 
assessment on money received by them from Overseas Holdings (Pty) Ltd, a South 
African company. As the parties had agreed that the position of Lever Brothers and 
Unilever Ltd and Associated Enterprises Ltd was similar and therefore one case would 
settle the dispute in both, the judgment referred to the two companies as “Levers” 
and the third company as “Overseas Holdings”.
2On 31 December 1937, an agreement was entered into at Rotterdam, Holland, 
between Levers, an English company, Mavibel (Maatschappy voor Internationale 
Beleggingen N.V.), a Dutch company (a subsidiary of Lever Brothers and Unilever NV, 
also a Dutch company), and a trustee company in England, The Whitehall Trust Ltd. 
The agreement was amended in April 1939 by a further agreement entered into at 
Rotterdam, and the effect of the two agreements was that Levers sold and transferred 
certain shares to Mavibel and ceded debts to Mavibel, in return for which Mavibel 
paid an amount in cash and became liable to Levers for the sum of £11 000 000, 
payable on or before 31 December 1961. Mavibel agreed to pay interest on this sum, 
and as security for the amount owing, transferred to or deposited with the trustee 
shares in an American company, Lever Brothers Company of Boston.
3The agreement contained a number of clauses which gave Levers effective control 
over the shares. The trustee could not transfer or deal with the shares unless the 
debt had been fully paid, and if Mavibel failed to perform any of the obligations, the 
trustee would hold the shares on behalf of Levers, the debt would be cancelled and 
any excess of the value of the shares over the debt would be adjusted by a money 
payment. Another clause provided for circumstances in which the shares would be 
held by the trustee on behalf of Levers:7
In the event of any war, rebellion, civil commotion or political or constitutional disturbance 
or change affecting England the Netherlands or any country in which any of the Companies 
6 14 SATC 1 at 3.
7 14 SATC 1 at 4.
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or Corporate Bodies whose capital comprise any of the Shares are domiciled or any law 
being passed or any act being done as a result of which the property in the Shares or any 
benefi ts directly or indirectly receivable therefrom would . . . pass to any Government or to 
any third party or the rights . . . or the benefi cial ownership of the Pledged Shares . . . being 
for any reason in jeopardy or likely to be jeopardised . . . ”the emergency” . . . [the shares 
would be held by the Trustee on behalf of Levers]. 
1Clearly the companies included this clause at a time when the outbreak of war was 
a distinct possibility. Then on 15 March 1939, on the instructions of Levers, Overseas 
Holdings was incorporated in the (then) Union of South Africa. On the same day, a 
second company, Internationale Maatschappy voor Handel en Nywerheid Beperk, was 
also incorporated in the Union. This second company held the shares in Overseas 
Holdings, and the effective control over the shares of this second company was in the 
hands of Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd N.V. and Associated Enterprises. A number 
of agreements were entered into in March 1940, the effect of which was that Overseas 
Holdings bought from Mavibel their entire interest in the shares held as security by 
The Whitehall Trust and, subject to certain modifications, stepped into the shoes of 
Mavibel. One significant modification related to the place of payment, previously 
at Mavibel’s registered office in Rotterdam, but then at Levers’ registered office in 
England by sterling cheque in London. None of the agreements giving rise to the 
indebtedness and the liability to pay interest were entered into in South Africa (which 
Watermeyer CJ, in his judgment, considered to be relevant). The agreements were, 
however, assented to by the Union Treasury on condition that no payment of capital 
or interest would be made by Overseas Holdings from assets in the Union.
2Overseas Holdings paid the interest due to Levers in London in each of the years 
1940 to 1942 out of dividends received in the United States of America on the American 
shares they held. It was this interest that the Commissioner assessed to income tax 
in South Africa. The matter was finally brought on appeal to the Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court (now the Supreme Court of Appeal). The Commissioner’s 
claim was that the interest was not a capital receipt (irrelevant for the purposes of the 
present article), the interest was due on a loan made to a company incorporated in 
South Africa, the “source” of interest paid on a loan of money is the principal debt 
and the debt is regarded in law as being located where the debtor resides.
Lever Brothers and the Second World War: the historical context8
1When the first agreement was entered into between Lever Brothers and Mavibel 
on 31 December 1937, it was clear to the directors of both companies that war was 
8 Encyclopaedia Britannica. 1961. World War II. Volume 23. London: Encyclopaedia Britannica Ltd.
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imminent. In March 1936, Hitler had marched into the Rhineland and shortly after 
had become involved in the Spanish Civil War as a proving ground for his military 
strength and weapons. In March 1938, German troops marched into Austria, and in 
September 1938, in terms of the Munich Agreement, Germany annexed the Sudetan 
region in Czechoslovakia. In March 1939, Overseas Holdings was incorporated in the 
Union of South Africa and a few months later, in September 1939, Germany attacked 
Poland. In the same month, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. In 
March 1940, the agreements were entered into which substituted Overseas Holdings 
for the Dutch company, Mavibel, and on the 10 May 1940, Holland was invaded by 
Germany. In the Lever Brothers case, Watermeyer CJ speculated that “[p]robably the 
substitution of Overseas Holdings for Mavibel was effected in order to avert certain 
consequences which were foreseen if Holland were occupied by the enemy . . . .”9 
It seems clear that this, and this only, was indeed the reason for its incorporation.
Watermeyer CJ’s judgment
1Watermeyer CJ started his judgment by quoting the definition of gross income as it 
then read:10
“gross income” means the total amount which has been received by or which has accrued 
to a taxpayer from a source which is within the Union or which is deemed to be within the 
Union, other than receipts and accruals of a capital nature. 
1He went on to state that the word “source” is a metaphorical expression and “the 
sense in which it is used in the Act must be determined”.11 In arriving at the meaning 
of “source” in the definition of “gross income”, he referred to the two problems (or 
questions) that arise:
• to determine what the source of “money” received by the taxpayer is (the originating 
cause); and
• to locate this source.
1This is the two-step test that has, it is submitted, stood the test of time.
2After relating the facts of the case, Watermeyer CJ proceeded to dismiss the 
Commissioner’s claim that the source of interest paid on a loan of money is the 
principal debt, which is located where the debtor resides, stating that12
 9 14 SATC 1 at 7.
10 Income Tax Act No. 31 of 1941; s 7.
11 14 SATC 1 at 8.
12 14 SATC 1 at 8.
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[p]rima facie, this contention appears to be somewhat artifi cial, because of the fi gurative 
language in which it is couched. A debt is a legal obligation, something having no corpo-
real existence; consequently it can have no real and actual situation in the material world. 
Metaphorically, however, by a legal fi ction it may have a situation in a place, determined by 
accepted legal rules. 
1In his complex argument, Watermeyer CJ considered the two aspects of the 
Commissioner’s claim – that the “source” of interest is the principal debt, and the 
source is located where the debtor resides. He compared the payment of interest 
on the loan of money to the payment of rent on the lease of fixed property and 
concluded by stating that a debt represented the legal obligation to repay the loan at 
the end of the period of the agreement and the claim that this obligation is the source 
of the interest on the debt is fallacious as, by parity of reasoning, the obligation on 
the lessee of property to return the property at the end of the period of lease would 
determine the source of the rent. He concluded:13 “Such a conclusion has only to be 
stated to refute itself and . . . shews to what surprising results the use of figurative 
language in a legal problem may lead.” He also referred14 to the fallacy of speaking 
of a debt carrying interest “as though interest were a sort of growth sprouting from 
the debt” (an echo of the tree and the fruit analogy used to differentiate capital and 
revenue income15).
2He concluded16 that “[a]s a rule the lender either gives credit to the borrower or 
transfers to him certain rights of obtaining credit which had previously belonged 
to the lender, and this supply of credit is the service which the lender performs for 
the borrower, in return for which the borrower pays him interest. Consequently 
this provision of credit is the originating cause or source of the interest received by 
the lender”. Watermeyer CJ had therefore answered the first of his two questions: 
determining the source of the interest. In his discussion of cases dealing with the 
problem of source, he also noted the statement by Innes CJ17 that the word “source” 
denotes “origin” and not “location” and concluded18 that “‘source’ does not denote the 
quarter from which the money is received, but the originating cause of the receipt 
(i.e., the particular activity of the taxpayer which earns money)”.
3In his typically thorough fashion, Watermeyer CJ went on to discuss what little 
precedent there was at the time in South Africa regarding the location of the source 
13 Supra at 9.
14 Supra.
15 CIR v Visser, 1937 TPD 77, 8 SATC 271.
16 14 SATC 1 at 10.
17 In Overseas Trust Co. Ltd. v CIR, 1925 A.D. 444, 2 SATC 71.
18 14 SATC 1 at 12.
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of income, and also referred to cases heard in other jurisdictions, in order to answer 
the second of his two questions: locating the source of the income. Although he 
discussed various cases dealing with the vexed question of locating the source of 
income that might have applied to the factual matrix of the Lever Brothers case, 
Watermeyer CJ did not reach a conclusion based on this discussion. These tests were, 
however, indirectly reflected in his final judgment.
4In the case of Liquidator, Rhodesia Metals Ltd. v Commissioner of Taxes19 Lord 
Atkin referred with approval to an extract from the dissenting judgment of De Villiers 
JA in another case:20 “source means not a legal concept but something which the 
practical man would regard as a real source of income. The ascertaining of the actual 
source is a practical hard matter of fact”. In locating the source of the interest in the 
Lever Brothers case, Watermeyer CJ accordingly went on to consider the facts of the 
case. He expressed some difficulty in differentiating the reasoning of the practical 
man from that of the theoretical lawyer, but nevertheless concluded21 that he could 
not think that “the practical man could ever come to the conclusion that the money 
came from a source in South Africa”. In reaching his conclusion that the interest was 
not from a source in the Union of South Africa, he gave the following reasons for his 
decision:22
[N]o business was carried on by the respondent company [Levers] in South Africa, no con-
tract was made by them in South Africa, no capital had been adventured by them in South 
Africa, no services were rendered by them in South Africa and no obligation resting on either 
party to the agreement had been performed or was to be performed in South Africa . . . 
1Watermeyer CJ did not conclude in positive terms that the location of the originating 
cause was where the service was provided (the credit that was made available in 
England), but in negative terms, with reference to the tests established in the case 
law that he had discussed.
The judgment of Davis AJA
1Davis AJA concurred with Watermeyer CJ that the interest was not from a source 
within South Africa, but he did not specifically agree that the source was in England. 
Based purely on an application of the practical man test, he concluded23 that the one 
19 1938 AD 282, 9 SATC 363.
20 In Overseas Trust Co. Ltd. v CIR. 
21 14 SATC 1 at 17.
22 Supra at 1.
23 14 SATC 1 at 21.
169 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd
place that the practical man would not select as the source of income was South 
Africa.24
Principles underlying the right of a country to levy tax
1Certain countries levy tax on the basis of source, as South Africa did prior to 1 
January 2001, while other countries levy tax on the basis of residence, as South 
Africa now does. In Kergeulen Sealing and Whaling Co. Ltd. v Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue25 (referred to as “the Kergeulen case”), Stratford CJ referred to the 
two principles that must be borne in mind when trying to ascertain the intention of 
the Income Tax Act in relation to source, which he called the “equitable” principle 
and the “effective” principle. The Kergeulen case was heard in 1939 (prior to the 
Lever Brothers case), and also involved the determination of whether certain income 
was taxable in South Africa as being from a source within South Africa.
2Neither the facts of the case nor the decision are relevant for the purposes of this 
article. In his judgment in the Kergeulen case, Stratford CJ referred26 to the equitable 
principles “generally found to underlie liability for tax”. He stated that in the case 
of the residence basis of tax, this principle is27 “that a resident, for the privilege and 
protection of residence, can justly be called upon to contribute to the cost of good order 
and government of the country that shelters him” and in the case of a source basis 
of tax, “the equity of the levy rests on the assumption that a country that produces 
wealth by reason of its natural resources or the activities of its inhabitants is entitled 
to a share of that wealth, wherever the recipient of it may live”.
3In the Lever Brothers case, Overseas Holdings, incorporated in South Africa, 
produced no wealth and carried out no income-producing activities in South Africa; 
it merely paid, in London, the interest on the principal debt that was owing to 
Lever Brothers, using dividends that it had received in the United States of America. 
Watermeyer CJ could have used this equitable principle described by Stratford CJ 
in the Kergeulen case to strengthen his conclusion that the interest was not from a 
source within South Africa or deemed to be within South Africa. As he was one of 
the (concurring) judges in the case, it is surprising that he did not do so.
24 Refer to the discussion of the practical man principle later in this article, where the grounds for Davis AJA’s judgment 
are elaborated on.
25 1939 AD 487, 10 SATC 363.
26 Supra at 381.
27 10 SATC 363 at 382.
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4The second principle that Stratford CJ referred to28 in the Kergeulen case was 
the “effectiveness” principle, which is based on the assumption that the country has 
effective means to enforce the levy, that is, whether the country has control of the 
source and therefore the ability to collect the tax. This principle is less relevant in the 
Lever Brothers case, but the government of the Union of South Africa did not have 
control over the interest paid to Lever Brothers or the income used to pay the interest.
The dissenting judgment of Schreiner JA
1In his judgment, Schreiner JA confirmed29 that the source of income in general is 
either some personal activity of the taxpayer, or some property over which he or she 
has rights or a combination of both and he earns income from other persons because 
he or she renders services to them, provides them with the use of his or her property, 
or carries on profit-making activities in the world of commerce and industry. He 
stated30 that “[i]n common parlance, by which it is a sound rule to judge definitions, 
the property itself, or . . . its use, is treated as the source of income”. He did not 
agree31 that “we are compelled by authority to find some activity of the taxpayer 
as in all cases the source of his income”. He then went on to conclude32 that, in 
his view, there was no good reason for treating the activities of letting property or 
providing the use of capital to earn interest or dividends as the source of income. 
He thus dismissed Watermeyer CJ’s use of the “activities” test and indirectly his 
analogy between granting the use of property and money. In his opinion, where 
the contract of loan was made and where the interest is payable are not relevant, 
and essentially the “interest is the “fruit” of the money and comes from where the 
money is”33 (again the fruit and the tree analogy that was used in the Visser case but, 
with respect, used incorrectly as this was a test used to distinguish capital and non-
capital income).
2Schreiner JA went on to discuss34 Overseas Holdings and the fact that, not only 
was the company registered in South Africa, but also the majority of its five directors 
resided in Durban, South Africa, where the head office of the company was situated. 
In his view, the place where the transactions were entered into was irrelevant. He 
28 Supra.
29 14 SATC 1 at 16.
30 Supra at 17.
31 14 SATC 1 at 17.
32 Supra at 19.
33 Supra.
34 Supra at 20.
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concluded that the source of Lever’s interest income was the debt itself, or the money 
of Levers in the possession of Overseas Holdings.
3Schreiner JA then went on to deal with the question of the location of the debt 
and, although he conceded35 that “the location of an incorporeal in space by a rule 
of law carries a flavour of artificiality”, in his view “even the practical business man 
would realise, when the matter was explained to him, that for certain purposes it was 
unavoidable”. In concluding that a debt exists where the debtor resides, he respectfully 
agreed with the statement by Lord Buckmaster36 that, “once it is assumed that a debt 
must have a local situation, it can only be where the debtor or creditor resides”, and 
the unanimous decision of the House of Lords in that case was that the debt exists 
where the debtor resides. Schreiner JA amplified this by remarking that if the locality 
of a debt depends on the place where it is recoverable, Levers could undoubtedly 
sue Overseas Holdings in South Africa to recover both the capital and the interest. 
Thus, while Watermeyer CJ, after carefully considering the decisions in various 
cases dealing with the source of income, went back to first principles to establish the 
source of interest in the Lever Brothers case, Schreiner JA based his judgment on one 
decision only, and that from a foreign jurisdiction.
4Schreiner JA also dismissed two potential factors that may have had a bearing on 
the source of income: the place from which the interest came, or the place to which 
it would go. In his view,37 it was “natural to suppose that [Parliament in the Union 
of South Africa] envisaged, as the source, the place from which the interest would 
ordinarily come and not the place to which it would go”, and that the argument was 
untenable that because most of the actual money used to pay the interest came from 
the United States of America (a small portion coming from London), the source was 
not in South Africa.
Watermeyer, Schreiner and Davis
1Ernest Frederick Watermeyer obtained his first degree in Mathematics, Oliver 
Deneys Schreiner obtained a Bachelor of Arts (Honours), with a first in classics, 
and Reginald Percy Davis also obtained a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in classics.38 
Watermeyer and Schreiner had both obtained their LLB at Cambridge University 
and Davis at Oxford.39
35 Supra.
36 In English, Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd. v Commissioner for Inland Revenue, 1932 A.C. 238 at 256.
37 14 SATC 1 at 21.
38 Girvin, S.D. 1996. The Architects of the Mixed Legal System, in Zimmerman, R. and Visser, D. Southern Cross: Civil Law 
and Common Law in South Africa. Cape Town: Juta, at 129.
39 Supra.
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2While practising, Watermeyer was described as a clever lawyer and convincing 
advocate with the habit of winning cases, possessed of a clear and lucid mind. As 
Chairman of the Special Income Tax Court for the Cape, it was said40 that “[h]is 
knowledge of mathematics stood him in good stead and his lucid judgment made 
clear many obscure points in this difficult branch of the Law”. He was also described41 
as “an erudite Roman-Dutch lawyer”. In another article,42 he was described as “the 
youngest and handsomest of the Cape Judges by all members of the fair sex . . . 
[but this] has not affected his inherent modesty and quiet manners”. Popular and 
esteemed, to his friends, he was known as “Billy”.43
3Schreiner was equally highly esteemed. He had “an extraordinary intellect”, but 
was not an eloquent speaker.44 Ellison Kahn said45 of Schreiner that “he was the 
greatest Chief Justice South Africa did not have”. Schreiner jokingly recounted that 
he had attended only one lecture on Roman-Dutch law and it was said of him that he 
professed that he seldom conducted a deep search for the fountains of Roman-Dutch 
law.46 Many instances of his wit and sense of humour have been described by Ellison 
Kahn.47 He tells48 of the remark made by Schreiner during the hearing of Big Ben 
Soap Industries Ltd v CIR:49 “I thought that the business of this company was boiling 
soap, not cooking the books.” Kahn also describes50 his one extravagance – fairly 
expensive cars that he was inclined to drive fast. Sir Alfred Denning, returning from 
a trip to the Kruger Park with Schreiner, said that “until his children were qualified 
in their careers he would prefer not to be driven by Oliver Schreiner”.
4Ellison Kahn describes51 Davis as one of the two who must have “brought up 
the rear in the Handsomeness Stakes” (by vote of the Cape Bar in about 1912) and 
tells of52 his “impatient and at times irascible nature . . . [as] reflected in an anecdote 
according to which he so forgot his judicial dignity as to tackle with an umbrella a 
man in his reserved seat”.
40 Mr Justice Watermeyer. 1923. SALJ at 104.
41 Supra.
42 Mr Justice Watermeyer. 1933. 2 South African Law Times at 48.
43 Mr Justice Watermeyer. 1923. SALJ at 105.
44 Oliver Deneys Schreiner – The Man and his Judicial World. 1980. 97 SALJ 566 at 591.
45 Kahn, E. 1991. Law, Life and Laughter. Legal Anecdotes and Portraits. Cape Town: Juta & Co Ltd, at 219.
46 Oliver Deneys Schreiner–The Man and his Judicial World at 590.
47 Law, Life and Laughter. Legal Anecdotes and Portraits.
48 Supra at 220.
49 1949 (1) SA 740 (A).
50 Law, Life and Laughter. Legal Anecdotes and Portraits at 220.
51 Supra at 103.
52 Supra at 35.
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5In a letter to his wife,53 Schreiner described working with Watermeyer in the 
following words, which seem to illustrate the respective approaches of these two 
judges in the Lever Brothers case:
The work is markedly more thoroughly done than when one sits in the Provincial Division . 
. . [Some] matters are heard . . . that one would be ready to dispose of in a rough and ready 
fashion without much delay, but we go over them with the utmost care and choose the words 
. . . that leave no room for mistake . . . The Chief, Billy, is a very wise judge with a big and 
well-stored brain. He guides our discussions with the artistry of a company chairman. 
1In another letter to his wife, Schreiner54 mentions that Davis had told him that he 
“had never disagreed with his great friend Watermeyer in the decision of a case”, 
which Schreiner had found to be an “amazing statement”.
2It was possibly also Watermeyer’s early training in mathematics that explains his 
preference in the Lever Brothers case for making his decision based on first principles 
and a set of normative tests to determine that the source of income was not within 
South Africa and to discount the value of the views of the practical man. Schreiner, 
who by his own admission had attended only one lecture in Roman-Dutch law, 
referred to only one earlier decision in support of his conclusion and placed greater 
weight on this practical man’s hypothetical viewpoint. Davis did not disagree with 
“his friend” Watermeyer.
The source principle, subsequent to the Lever Brothers case
1The decision in Lever Brothers case has lost some of its relevance. One of the reasons 
for this is the amendments that were made to the Income Tax Act. At the time the 
case was heard, South Africa taxed on the basis of source – that is, income from a 
source within South Africa or deemed to be within South Africa (the definition of 
“gross income”55). Section 9(1) of the Act56 provided for certain categories of income 
that were deemed to be from a source in the Union, but this deeming provision did 
not include interest. The tests that Watermeyer CJ developed in the Lever Brothers 
case therefore applied for 54 years, from the date the case was heard until the 
introduction in 199857 of Sections (6) and (7) of Section 9 into the Act, which dealt, 
inter alia, with the source of interest.
53 Supra at 336.
54 Law, Life and Laughter. Legal Anecdotes and Portraits at 35.
55 Section 7 of the Income Tax Act No. 31 of 1941.
56 Income Tax Act No. 31 of 1941.
57 Section 25(1)(b) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 30 of 1998.
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2On 1 January 2001, South Africa changed the basis on which it levied tax to that 
of residence. The definition of “gross income”58 was changed with the effect that 
residents are taxed on their worldwide income and non-residents on income from 
a source within or deemed to be within the Republic (the phrase “deemed to be 
within” was deleted with effect from 1 January 2012). Sections 9(6) and 9(7) remained 
unchanged until 1 January 2012, when Section 9 was substituted in its entirety and 
the definition of gross income amended. The new Section 9(2)(b) provides that an 
amount is received by or accrues to a person from a source within the Republic, if that 
amount constitutes interest that is attributable to an amount incurred by a person who 
is a resident (other than interest attributable to a permanent establishment outside 
the Republic), or is received or accrues in respect of the utilisation or application in 
the Republic by any person of any funds or any credit obtained in terms of any form 
of interest-bearing arrangement.
3Double tax agreements entered into between countries also affect the source rules 
of the respective countries, as they allocate taxing rights to the countries, based on 
certain attribution rules. In South Africa, Section 108 of the Income Tax Act provides 
that the National Executive may enter into any agreement for the prevention of or 
relief from double taxation with the government of any other country. After approval 
by Parliament and publication in the Government Gazette, they have the same effect 
as if enacted in the Income Tax Act. The allocation of taxing rights in terms of a 
double tax agreement therefore takes precedence over the South African source rules. 
No double tax agreements had been entered into between the Union and the United 
Kingdom or the Netherlands at the time the Lever Brothers case was heard. The 
double tax agreement between South Africa and the United Kingdom only came 
into force from 20 January 1971, while the double tax agreement between South 
Africa and the Netherlands only came into force from 17 December 2002.
4The income tax legislation as it now applies would have meant that, today, the 
interest paid by Overseas Holdings to Lever Brothers would have been taxed in South 
Africa, as the amount would have been incurred by a resident as defined. Nevertheless, 
Watermeyer CJ’s decision in the Lever Brothers case held sway from 1946 until 
1998 and the test used to locate the source of the supply of credit (the originating 
cause), as “the place where the credit is made available”, was universally applied by 
tax academics and scholars, despite the fact that, based on the facts of the case, his 
decision was couched in negative terms. Part of Watermeyer CJ’s decision still stands 
today. In cases dealing with source, where there are no legislated provisions, the two-
step test – identifying the originating cause and then locating it – is still relevant.
58 Section 1 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962.
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The practical man principle59
1The practical man has made its appearance in a number of cases dealing with the 
source of income. In Liquidator, Rhodesian Metals Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes,60 
Stratford CJ quoted from the Australian Courts:
the question (as to the source) must be decided as a practical matter of fact . . . Source means, 
not a legal concept, but something which a practical man would regard as a real source of 
income; the ascertainment of the actual source is a practical hard matter of fact . . . 
1In Rhodesian Metals Ltd (in Liquidation) v Commissioner of Taxes,61 it was held that 
“the question of source must in every case be determined by the facts of that case 
as a hard matter of fact”. This statement was again quoted in Liquidator, Rhodesian 
Metals.62 In the Lever Brothers case, each of the three judges referred to the practical 
man, but each applied the principle in a different way in interpreting the facts of 
the case.
2Watermeyer CJ, after referring63 to Lord Atkin’s admonition that “the question be 
asked what would the practical man regard as the real source of income”, expressed 
some difficulty in differentiating the reasoning of the practical man from that of the 
theoretical lawyer. Schreiner JA had a different view of what the practical man would 
have concluded, based on the facts of the case. He first refers64 to the “flavour of 
artificiality” that the law exhibits in locating an incorporeal in space, but concludes 
that “even the practical business man . . . would realize, when the matter was explained 
to him, that for certain purposes it is unavoidable” [emphasis added]. Later65 he again 
refers to the “practical business man” whose “hypothetical views on these matters 
are said to be entitled to great weight”, and expresses the opinion that this practical 
business man, having been informed that the Statute made it necessary to fix the 
local situation of the interest-bearing debt, would have “expressed a tentative layman’s 
view in favour of placing it at the residence of the debtor [but that] he would indicate 
that the obvious thing to do was to ask a lawyer” [emphasis added]. His final word66 
on the value of the opinion of the practical man was that it would not provide much 
assistance. Schreiner JA, even when limiting the practical man’s opinion to that of a 
59 This section of the article is based loosely on the discussion in A Critical Analysis of the Practical Man Principle in Com-
missioner for Inland Revenue v Lever Brothers and Unilever Ltd, written by one of the co-authors of the article.
60 1938 AD 282, 9 SATC 363 at 379.
61 1940 AD 432, 11 SATC 244 at 245.
62 At 249.
63 14 SATC 1 at 17.
64 14 SATC 1 at 21.
65 Supra at 23.
66 Supra at 23.
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business man and after the matter had been explained to him, and having conceded 
that the view of the practical man carries great weight, considered that his opinion 
would be of little value in the present case.
3Davis AJA,67 while concurring with Watermeyer CJ’s decision, appears to have 
based his entire judgment on what the practical man would have thought. He referred 
to the approval of the “practical man test” by the Privy Council in Rhodesia Metals (in 
Liquidation) v CIR, which he “felt bound to adopt” and concluded that he had “little 
doubt that the practical man would say that the source of Lever’s income was the 
provision by it of assets in America and the giving of credit in England . . . [b]ut the 
one place he would not choose would be South Africa”. Davis AJA emphasised the 
fact that Treasury had stipulated that no capital or interest could be paid from South 
African funds and that both Treasury and the practical man knew “as a practical 
hard matter of fact” that none had been so paid. Furthermore, the debtor possessed 
no assets in South Africa from which it could be paid. The one place that the practical 
man would not select as the source of the income, therefore, was South Africa.
4The markedly different interpretations that these three judges placed on what the 
practical man would have decided, calls into question the value of the principle68that 
“source should not be seen as a legal concept; rather emphasis should be placed on 
what the ‘practical man’ would regard as the real source of income”. This concept 
was reinforced in the judgment of Schreiner JA when he noted that the “hypothetical 
views” of the practical business man “are said to be entitled to great weight”.69 
Similarly, Davis AJA adopted “the practical man” with the strongest favour and 
based his entire judgment on this concept.70
5The role of the practical man, as noted indirectly by Davis AJA,71 is to guard 
against the overzealous application of legal doctrine to issues that are heavily 
contingent on the factual matrix of a specific case.72 A similar sentiment can be found 
in the judgment of Schreiner JA73 where he stresses the importance of defining terms 
according to “ordinary linguistic usage” or “common parlance”.74 The purpose of 
67 Supra at 24.
68 As stated in Nathan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1918) 25 CLR 183.
69 14 SATC 1 at 22.
70 Supra at 23.
71 Supra.
72 Nourse, V. 2008. After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question. New Criminal Law 
Review. Volume 11(1) 33 at 38. Available at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1123. (accessed 8 May 
2012).
73 14 SATC 1 at 17.
74 Supra.
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this is to prevent unnecessarily artificial operation of the law. Balazs75 succinctly 
summarised this approach as follows:
What the cases require is that the truth of the matter be sought with an eye focused on practi-
cal business affairs, rather than on nice distinctions of the law. For the word “source”, in 
this context, has no precise or technical reference. It expresses only a general conception of 
origin, leading the mind broadly, by analogy. The true meaning of the word evokes springs 
in grottos at Delphi, sooner than the incidence of taxes. So the exactness which the lawyer is 
prone to seek must be consciously set aside; indeed, with respect to a choice between various 
contributing factors, it cannot be attained. 
1This practical man principle therefore provides a lens through which Watermeyer 
CJ’s two-step test ought to be seen. Balazs76 comments further that “[p]ractical reality 
is not a test so much as an attitude of mind in which the Court should approach the 
task of judgment”.
2The striking feature of the judges’ application of the practical man principle is 
that they were all manifestly different. The primary distinction between all of the 
judgments was their interpretation and application of the practical man. Given that 
the construct of the practical man can be open to such a wide range of interpretations, 
its effectiveness as a tool for deciding cases is doubtful, and a number of problems 
arise when a notion such as the practical man is used in such a manner.
3In order to accurately assess the impact of the practical man concept on judicial 
decisions, it is first important to understand the weight it is afforded in the process 
of coming to a conclusion. Although this is not decisively stated in the Lever Brothers 
case, there are a number of statements that point towards an answer. The most frank 
of these is the statement of Davis AJA in which he describes the practical man as 
a “test” that he is bound to adopt.77 If this interpretation is followed, the use of the 
practical man concept is mandatory and must be a significant influencing factor in 
coming to a conclusion. Schreiner JA’s approach is similar when he states that the 
views of the practical man are, “entitled to great weight.”78 The least prescriptive 
of the judges in the Lever Brothers case is Watermeyer CJ who merely calls this a 
suggestion that seemingly does not need to be followed.79 It would seem that there is 
75 Balazs, J. 2009. An Introducti on to Australia’s Tax System: How Source is Determined, at 7. Available at: http://www.blwllp.
com/getattachment/a00ed84b-b7b8-429a-b39f-2e875a91e6a6/How-is-Source-Determined—.aspx (accessed 8 
May 2012).
76 An Introduction to Australia’s Tax System: How Source is Determined, at 7.
77 14 SATC 1 at 23.
78 Supra at 22.
79 Supra at 15.
E.M. Stack, D. Grenville, R. Poole, H. Harnett & E. Horn
178
therefore no unanimous conclusion in the Lever Brothers case on the question of how 
much weight should be placed on the practical man test.
4Assistance in this regard can be gained from the case that initiated the concept 
of the practical man. In Nathan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation80 it was held 
that the word “source” was intended by the legislature not to be “a legal concept, 
but something which a practical man would regard as a real source of income”. 
While the Nathan case was referring to the Australian legislation, there are sufficient 
similarities with the South African Income Tax Act as well as the acceptance of this 
dictum in a number of South African cases, to conclude that it has equal application 
in South Africa. It would seem therefore that the primary question of source is, as 
confirmed by De Villiers JA,81 Lord Atkin82 and Watermeyer CJ,83 “a practical hard 
matter of fact”. The core of a source enquiry is therefore intended to be a factual 
analysis and that this is facilitated by the practical man in “practical reality”.84
5Although Watermeyer CJ does not expressly state that the view of the practical 
man is a mandatory consideration, it is submitted that there is sufficient agreement 
between Schreiner JA, Davis AJA and the judges of previous cases to conclude that 
it is. It necessarily follows that if the practical man is a mandatory consideration, it 
must have some weight in the outcome of the judgment. The best description of the 
weight that is to be given to the views of the practical man therefore, it is submitted, 
is to be found in Schreiner JA’s comment that it is to be accorded “great weight”.85
6The first problem that arises when requiring that a concept such as the practical 
man should be given great weight is that it is not well suited to dealing with, as 
Schreiner JA recognises,86 complex legal issues. It is nevertheless stated that the 
question of source is not a legal issue but a factual question.87 The relationship 
between factual and legal questions may, however, be blurred in difficult cases. It 
is clear that Watermeyer CJ’s two-step test is essentially two questions of fact. First, 
what is the originating cause of income, and second, where is it located? The issue, 
however, arises when, as Watermeyer CJ, recognises88
[a] debt is a legal obligation, something having no corporeal existence; consequently it can 
have no real and actual situation in the material world. Metaphorically, however, by legal fi c-
tion, it may have a situation in a place, determined by accepted legal rules [emphasis added]. 
80 In An Introduction to Australia’s Tax System: How Source is Determined, at 6.
81 Liquidator, Rhodesia Metals, Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes, 1938 AD 282.
82 Rhodesia Metals (in Liquidation), Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes, 1940 AD 432.
83 14 SATC 1 at 15.
84 An Introduction to Australia’s Tax System: How Source is Determined.
85 14 SATC 1.
86 Supra.
87 Nathan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.
88 14 SATC 1 at 8.
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1Therefore, while the determination of source is a question of fact at its core, this 
cannot be the end of the enquiry. There are legal questions that must be answered 
before the question of fact can be addressed. In the Lever Brothers case, these legal 
issues meant an adequate description of the incorporeal debt, which is created by 
the operation of the law and must therefore be fully described in legal terms. As 
Schreiner JA notes, “the location of an incorporeal in space by a rule of law carries a 
flavour of artificiality [emphasis added]”.89 Accordingly, this implies that it is not an 
issue of practicality, which by its nature is not artificial. Furthermore, it is submitted 
that, if the practical man were permitted to engage in complex legal issues such as 
the artificiality of an incorporeal, the effect of this would be to dilute the practical 
man concept to such a degree that it can no longer perform the function for which 
it was introduced.
2If the practical man is intended to serve an important function in the judicial 
process, one that is not easily reconciled with legal fictions, the second problem that 
arises is how is this tool to be used? An analogy can be found in the similar concept 
of the “reasonable man” from criminal law and the law of delict. This concept 
originated as a means with which to explain the law to lay people in a jury. This is 
summed up as follows in the case of R v Smith:90
[T]he concept of the ”reasonable man” has never been more than a way of explaining the 
law to a jury; an anthropomorphic image to convey to them, with suitable degree of vivid-
ness, the legal principle that even under provocation, people must conform to an objective 
standard of behaviour that society is entitled to expect. 
1The problem is essentially that, in criminal cases, for example, persons on trial 
must be tried according to their own characteristics. In other words, there must be 
a subjective approach. This approach would, however, lead to injustices where it is 
applied too strictly. As Nourse91 notes, “the defendant’s norms will acquit him”. This 
accordingly requires a call to objectivity. An overly objective approach, however, may 
be similarly unjust, as important factors such as the defendant’s age, mental capacity 
and physical characteristics, as examples, will be neglected.92 Many countries have 
accordingly adopted a hybrid approach: one that treats defendants subjectively, but 
then also requires that they comply with a certain standard expected by society. This 
standard is that of the reasonable man.93
89 14 SATC 1 at 20.
90 R v Smith (Morgan) [2000] 4 A.E.R. 289 at 172 E–F.
91 After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question, at 36.
92 After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question.
93 Alternatively termed in various legal areas: the layman, prudent man or bonus pater familias (the good family father).
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2The reasonable man concept, while being applied widely, is not without difficulty. 
Nourse argues that, “we create [the fact/law] dilemma by placing the normative 
question [or legal question] within the guise of a human being [or factual question]”.94 
Furthermore, she contends that this dilemma may be removed by conceiving the 
concept differently. At the heart of the concept, Nourse argues, is that the reasonable 
man is a tool for preventing legal norms from being applied too strictly to particular 
cases. What it achieves therefore is an efficient way of reflecting the law as it stands, 
and then restraining its overzealous application by requiring that the factual matrix 
be considered.95 This approach, it is submitted, is similar to that of using the practical 
man concept in questions of the source of income. There are legal concepts that 
must be applied, but it is submitted that the court, in the Nathan case, was aware 
that if a prescriptive body of law were to develop, this would lead to unjust results.96 
The approach by Nourse, it is submitted, provides a sound framework with which 
to understand the application of the reasonable man and practical man concepts. 
Hence legal rules that have been developed must be applied where their application is 
warranted but, realising the potentially harsh results of this, they should be mediated. 
The tool that criminal law, the law of delict and cases involving source have chosen 
to achieve this, is the practical/reasonable man. The role of the court is not to apply 
the law blindly, but to achieve justice.
Conclusion
1Starting with an in-depth discussion of the Lever Brothers case, this article has traced 
a path through history, the lives of the judges involved in the case, the development 
of the source rules in South Africa and the problematic intrusion of the practical 
man into the world of the legal theorist. The difficult nature of the decision that the 
judges were called on to give in the case was the result of the complicated agreements 
entered into and the problem of determining the source of the interest on a loan 
from a company resident in England to a South African member of the same group 
of companies, where the interest was payable in London out of dividends received 
in the United States of America on shares in an American member of the group 
of companies. In the absence of legislative provisions dealing with the source of 
particular classes of income, and as South African case law had not yet developed 
clear guidelines for determining the source of interest, the judges had to determine 
94 After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question.
95 Supra at 38.
96 An Introduction to Australia’s Tax System: How Source is Determined, at 7.
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the originating cause of the interest, which could have been the provision of the 
credit or the debt itself, and then had to locate this originating cause, which could 
have been South Africa, England or even the United States of America. It was no 
wonder that two judges concurred, but on different grounds, and the third dissented.
2In a decision that stood unchallenged for 54 years, Watermeyer CJ established that 
a two-stage test had to be used to determine the source of interest income – finding 
the originating cause and then locating it. He held that the provision of credit was the 
originating cause and that it was situated where the credit was provided. Subsequent 
changes to the Income Tax Act have provided new rules for locating the source of 
interest income within South Africa, but nevertheless the two-step test Watermeyer 
CJ established still has application to other classes of income, where no specific 
legislative provisions determine their source.
3The most difficult task for the three judges in the case was to locate the source of 
the interest that the Commissioner for Inland Revenue had assessed to tax in South 
Africa. In earlier cases, the location of the source of interest was referred to as “a 
hard practical matter of fact”, in which the place where the practical man would 
locate it was the determining factor. Unfortunately the three judges differed in their 
interpretation of their “practical man’s” reasoning and their view of the weight to be 
attributed to the principle of the practical man.
4This lack of consensus by the three judges in applying the practical man principle 
prompted the research into the validity of this principle. After discussing the role of 
the practical man in tax law and the “reasonable man” in other branches of law, it 
was concluded that the principle should be applied, not in the place of legal theory 
and precedent, but to restrain their use when their application would lead to an 
unjust result.
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